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Abstract
The first part of the article emphasizes the fallacy of the principle of semantic 
autonomy of the sign, which in most cases constitutes the fundamental presumption 
of the linguistic description (the so-called “meanings of words, sentences, texts and 
verbal language”). The dynamic communicative model of the verbal process assumes 
that: 1) the “language” metaphor is ineffective for explaining semantic formation in a 
word-containing semiotic action; 2) the used concepts of a sign (words, sentences, 
texts) do not have an autonomous semantic (meaning-forming) identity if interpreted 
outside of a complex semiotic actions performed by the author (actor); 3) what is 
produced and interpreted in the natural communicative process is the semiotic impact 
(act) of the communicant, and not a structure of self-significant signs (words); 4) any 
semiotic (communicative) action is interpreted as complex, multi-channel, multi­
factor. The text is defined in the article as a sequence of non-autonomous verbal 
elements that just “hint” at the corresponding communicative actions. 
Communicative actions (sought in the generation and interpretation) are perceived in 
identity on the basis of parameters that the author of the action and then the 
interpreter think in complex reality.
Such an approach is helpful in interpreting the general manner and the particular 
cases of Aquila’s Bible translation, that is suggested in the second part of the article. 
Non-grammatical (non-language) interpretation of what Aquila did, allows 
describing verbal data more correctly. The result of his work (as it was thought by 
himself) was not a translation in strict sense. That was a component of a traditional 
communicative practice of reading and studying the Scripture in the Greek-speaking 
diaspora communities. Aquila’s text can be appreciated and understood adequately 
just in the frame of this practice, being a part of the complex communicative 
situations (the latter can be understood and interpreted, in contrast with language and 
grammar). His text had a big success not in the field of the Greek language or 
grammar but in the field of communicative (historical-cultural-religious) reality, in 
the same way as any other verbal text tends to be.
научный результат вопросы теоретической и прикладной лингвистики 
RESEARCH RESULT THEORETICAL AND APPLIED LINGUISTICS
Научный результат. Вопросы теоретической и прикладной лингвистики. Т.6, №1,2020. С. 65-72
Research result. Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, 6 (1). 2020. P 65-72
Keywords: Communicative model; language theory; semiotic impact;
communicative action; autonomy of signs; Aquila’s Bible translation; translation 
method; Greek grammar
How to cite: Vdovichenko A.V. (2020). Aquila’s Bible translation in the 
communicative theoretical model (Series of Papers “Standard Languages and Literay 
Traditions: Contacts and Influences” directed by Professor Irina I. Chelysheva and P 
rofessor Viktor Ya. Porkhomovsky, Institute of Linguistics RAS, Moscow). 
Research Result. Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, V.6 (1), 65-72, DOI: 
10.18413/2313-8912-2020-6-1-0-7
The key point of the paper is a linguistic 
idea which could be spread and projected on 
any semiotic process. So, first, I will define the 
linguistic contours of the problem. Then, I will 
point out some consequences actual for the 
theory of signs. Finally, I will demonstrate how 
it works in a concrete linguistic (at the same 
time historical and cultural) episode.
Linguistic contours: communicative
(semiotic) impact
After more than half a century of 
linguistic discussions it became rather 
impossible to deny that any natural verbal 
process is a communicative impact (action). 
The Sender has no reasons to organize a 
semiotic procedure if he/she doesn’t mean to 
make an influence on the imaginable Receiver 
(i.e. a perceived “owner” of consciousness). So 
the process of producing sense in verbal data 
(that is causa finalis of any natural verbal fact) 
has a perspective to be explained just in close 
connection with the concept of communicative 
action (impact, influence). There is an 
individual Actor in every concrete 
communicative act, having his/her own aims 
and tasks, choosing the ways of acting, forming 
and focusing the objects, manipulating with the 
Receiver’s attention and so on.
To demonstrate the difference between 
“words of a language” and a communicative 
action (with verbal component) it is enough to 
represent, first, un-real (“unnatural”) linguistic 
data, and, then, natural ones.
“Unnatural” linguistic data is represented 
below:
[Where is he going?]
This utterance is sure to be grammatically 
correct. The semantics seem to be regular. The
“language” is in order. Chomsky’s “colorless green 
ideas” do not “sleep furiously” (Chomsky 
1957: 15) here, and even do not make us think 
of them. Why is it possible to say that this 
utterance is definitely un-realistic (unnatural)?
The answer is rather obvious: the 
utterance (being randomly chosen here) does 
not produce any communicative sense. It is not 
integrated in the communicative procedure in 
any explainable way. It is not (a detectable part 
of) a real communicative action. To understand 
anything is impossible despite correct grammar. 
In the real verbal process a Sender makes 
something when speaking/writing. Here one 
can not define who does and what is done. 
That’s why it is not natural verbal data.
Worth noting that the same utterance 
(“where is he going?”) could be totally clear if 
being an actual communicative action. The 
opposite, the grammar of the same utterance could 
be totally incorrect if it is posed in a 
communicative action having “wrong” parametrs: 
the speaker could mean in fact “them” or “her” 
by saying “he” etc. In fact, if not being posed 
in actual communicative reality, the verbal 
data have no definite semantics and no detectale 
grammar.
In turn, to demonstrate natural linguistic 
data, it is worth to point out an actual 
communicative action. As for instance:[Here 
you can not define who does and what is done] 
(see above).
In the definite moment of the text (the 
sequence of the verbal traces of communicative 
actions) this verbal element of the definite 
impact was clear. The opposite, if the same 
utterance is removed from the actual action, the 
sense is also gone away.
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The change of the status of the same 
phrase from not understandable to 
understandable, is possible because what is 
generated and interpreted in the natural 
communicative process, is not the very 
autonomous verbal form of the statement. 
Verbal data if represented by a structure which 
has been artificially removed from the 
“domestic” communicative action, could be no 
more interpreted identically. It is no more 
integrated into an authentic coordinate system 
which gives it a permission (a capacity) to mean 
something. Verbal structure, in order to be 
interpreted is not enough to be a fact of a 
language. It needs to be a fact of communication, 
or something integrated into a concrete 
communicative procedure (Vdovichenko 2009).
It is worth noting again that in this above, 
as well as in any other samples of natural 
communication (with or without verbal channel 
used) the sense production is a process 
organized by someone: an impact (action) is 
something done by an actor. So the sense in 
semiotic data (verbal or any other) is a 
communicative phenomenon, or communi­
cation-dependent, performative, interactional, 
individually conceivable phenomenon. For the 
speaker, sense production deals with the attempt 
to influence the conceivable addressee in the 
parameterized communicative space. For the 
addressee (and then, for the secondary 
interpreter), understanding author’s attempts 
deals with the ascension to the cognitive state of 
the person who produced the action in a given 
multifactor situation. Interpretation necessarily 
implies the establishment of a set of parameters 
that the author had in his mind when acting, 
however distant and lost in space and time he 
was.
Semiotic consequences: language can 
not produce sense, signs can not signify
The consequences of evident personal 
performativity of any natural verbal process are 
as follow:
1. “Language” while being principally 
impersonal and non-actional (having no actor) is 
not effective as a metaphor explaining 
communicative sense-producing process.
In natural conditions of speaking/writing, 
the ancient Saussure’s language (system of signs 
generating meaningful utterances) loses its 
theoretical capacity. It becomes ineffective as a 
conceptual instrument. As the generation of 
meaning is localized in the individually defined 
communicative procedure, the metaphor 
“language” becomes unsuitable for modeling 
natural verbal process: whereas the essence of 
verbal, like any other semiotic act, is the 
performance of personal communicative tasks, 
the language, while being principally 
impersonal, does not have a source of any sense. 
The individual consciousness if being 
fundamentally absent in common instrument of 
speaking/writing, does not determine 
communicative goals or fulfill performative 
tasks. In the language itself there is no identical 
connection between semainon and 
semainomenon, which both are thought 
situationally and purposefully by the author and 
addressee (see the samples above). Definite 
meanings or sense can certainly not occur in 
language, since they are localized in the personal 
cognitive sphere as a certain image, concept, 
representation. They are being created actively 
or re-actively in the individual consciousness 
and then involved in a conceivable interaction. 
Due to the lack of personality, “language” 
fundamentally lacks the communication 
realized by the participants, or the “sender- 
recipient” relations. It is totally static, though 
what is happening in semiotic realm is a process 
of purposeful influence on the imaginable 
consciousness. If being out of the dynamics of 
communication, the fundamental causa finalis 
of actual verbal process (particular case of 
semiotic process) can not be detected and 
interpreted.
Thus, in reality, the speaker/writer does 
not speak/write with language (common “one 
and the same”), but makes changes in the 
conceivable communicative space. The 
linguistic “one and the same” does not interest 
him principally. Why to speak English or French 
if every language is already known? Why to do 
permanently the same, to say hallo, as for 
instance? The reason of what is really happening
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deals with personal behavior, or semiotic deeds, 
having values hinc et nunc for the communicant. 
That’s why he/she is not interested in verbal 
cliches (linguistic data) themselves. He/she 
needs to make something new that language is 
incapable to do: sharing ideas, emotions, 
feelings, forming objects, setting links, creating 
causality, organizing practical and other 
interaction etc. All that can not be produced by 
language itself due to the absence of an acting 
individual, that is a dynamic active principle.
In fact, one can see that the obligatory 
characteristics of natural semiotic (including 
verbal) process: the appeal to a certain audience 
(so called communicativity), the planning and 
making changes in the consciousness of the 
given audience (actionality), certain conditions 
for performing the semiotic action 
(situationality), individual awareness of 
interaction (cognition), as well as indirect, often 
differ interpretation of the communicant’s action 
(interpretability), all these properties of real 
communicative process are completely ignored 
by “language”, or by the language model of 
sense production.
So, if one searches for sources of sense in 
what is spoken/ written, language is not a correct 
destination. For the fundamental senselessness, 
language can be just a subsidiary mnemonic 
scheme and can not be studied as a sense 
(meaning) generating unit (Vdovichenko 2009).
2. Elements (“signs”) of verbal process are 
not identical in themselves; they are empty and 
senseless without performativity of a concrete 
individual communicative procedure.
They acquire such a status by following 
the disappearing “language”: its elements 
(sounds, morphemes, cliches etc.) also can not 
be “something”, if the whole verbal complex is 
regarded autonomously, without being 
connected to a working (realizing 
communicative procedures) source of sense 
production, that is, to an individual 
consciousness.
Thus, an arrow with the above inscription 
“Registration” drawn on a paper sheet, can not 
make sense if the paper lies prostrate on the floor, 
after an uncontrollable fall from the place on the
wall where it was previously fixed by the 
conference organizer’s hand. In this “sign” in 
his current situation, there is no understandable 
communicative action. “Registration” could not 
be found where the “sign” on the floor indicates 
to at the moment. Moreover, the conference has 
long been over. Therefore, it can hardly be 
acknowledged as a “sign”: in this arrow bearing 
an inscription, there is already no sense (some 
content, or planned effect, thought by the author 
of the semiotic action), despite the relative 
stability of the external form. In fact, by means 
of this arrow the organizer of the conference 
once pointed out a different (rather than now) 
direction, having in mind another disposition of 
the addressee in relation to the arrow, another 
period of relevance of the “sign”, another 
moment of interaction with the addressee, etc.
To represent the “arrow with the 
inscription” to be a “sign” again, one should 
recreate the personally conceived 
communication procedure. To do that is 
impossible by studying the body of the “sign” 
itself. If the conceivable parameters of the 
communicative action are not recreated, the sign 
“arrow with an inscription Registration” turns 
out to be empty and even seems to be completely 
non-existent: it does not say anything to anyone, 
does not point to anything, does not give any 
reasonable recommendations. In other words, 
the action of the source of communicative 
intention is not detectable in it. The act of the 
person who is conscious of his influence, is not 
identified. From the arrow with the inscription 
itself one could hardly achieve an autonomous 
sense (or meaning).
It is rather obvious that any “sign” being 
considered separately from a personal 
meaningful communicative act (including word, 
sentence and text), behaves in a similar way: 
while the sign’s body is deprived of the 
organizing sense-producing principle, such a 
sign disappears, does not exist as such. 
Apparently, the required condition for the 
appearance of a sign (or what one can 
conditionally count as a sign, say, as in Peirce’s 
or Saussure’s interpretation) is not a stable 
objective form and a meaning attached to it from
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nobody knows where, but the opportunity to see 
behind him a personal concrete communicative 
process (a semiotic act).
In addition, the problem of the sign 
implies a rather vague procedure of isolating a 
particular object matter, which can be presented 
as a semainon (signifier). In other words, the 
question transmitted into practice consists in 
how many signs one should count, say, in the 
word [other]. The possibility to recognize that 
there are five, four, three or two signs (five 
graphemes, four phonemes, three sounds, two 
syllables) in the given word, and that the whole 
word is also an entire indivisible sign, testifies 
to the utilitarian character of defining “signs”: 
the observer calculates them according to the 
criterion he introduced himself.
One should add also the fact that the body 
of the sign is a kind of empty reservoir, a shell, 
a wrapper which by itself has an independent 
value only in a limited number of cases, where 
the material meaningless component of the 
“sign” could play a role (for instance, in the 
poetic meter, in spelling, in polygraphy, where, 
say, the replacement of [other] by [different] 
may be unequal). In the ordinary sense­
generating (“working”) mode of verbal cliches, 
the speaker/writer and the addressee (including 
the indirect one) do not distinguish “units of 
natural speaking” either at the level of sounds- 
morphemes-syllables, or at the level of words, if 
the communicative action is performed and 
interpreted unproblematic.
Thus, words (“signs”) by themselves can 
not be summands of the total sum of meaning 
arising in the utterance, since each “summand” 
has no definite meaning. In fact, that must be 
established in the real speech (writing): 
autonomous words (“signs”) do not have 
conceivable identity and are not capable of 
having a concrete meaning to be a definite 
summand of the total understandable utterance.
Thus, every word of the last utterances 
(see above) possesses much more values than 
the only definite one, which is necessary for a 
firm understanding of the whole utterance: [fact], 
[that], [must], [be], [establish], [real], [speech], 
[writing], [word], [sign], etc.
It should be noted that the salutary 
reference to the “context”, which could make the 
word be understood in identity, is precisely 
indicative of the semantic insufficiency of the 
autonomous word (the main Saussure’s “sign”): 
it is clear enough that something extraneous, 
which extends beyond the word, is needed (that 
is the so-called context), without which a word 
is not capable of producing an independent 
meaning (sense).
Moreover, if remembering the samples 
above (Here you can not define who does and 
what is done, etc.) one should admit that 
utterance could not be a sufficient context for a 
word: such a “guarantor of identity” can not be 
recognized as independent and meaningful itself.
It seems that the theory of generating 
sense in verbal data needs at least a concept of 
“consituation”, or “communicative (that is, 
complex, not just verbal) context”, which would 
take the causes of meaning formation far beyond 
the verbal sequence. Such “signs” as words and 
sentences could gain the semantic identity just if 
placed in authentic communicative procedure, 
the external source of actional sense.
The observer, however, discerns “signs” 
by dividing into visible parts the material 
component of a communicative action, while the 
action itself has a non-verbal and integral 
meaning.
Thus, in the above sample, one should 
divide into parts the arrow and the inscription 
Registration, when searching for “signs”. The 
concrete sense-producing process, however, is 
realized not only by the arrow and the 
inscription, but much more by the personal 
communicative intention, which is recreated 
during the interpretation, by the whole set of 
conceivable parameters of the action, including 
the disposition of the addressee and the “body of 
the sign”, etc. It is therefore clear that each “sign” 
which was found by dividing the material 
elements of complex communicative action, 
will be something inadequate, not conveying the 
character (mechanism) of the multidimensional 
communicative dynamics.
At last, the third sequence:
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3. If language can not produce sense (due 
to the lack of a communicant acting), and signs 
themselves can not signify, and even do not exist 
independently (due to the lack of autonomous 
definite meaning), what or who is able to 
generate sense? In such a disposition one should 
admit the communicative action (semiotic deed) 
as the only source of semantic identity. What 
speaker/writer (as a Sender) produces and 
listener/reader (as a Receiver) understands is an 
actual (performative) complex communicative 
action, not just verbal formulas (elements of 
structure of empty “language”). To say this in 
other words, what is spoken or written (and then 
understood) is the activity of a communicant 
(known or reconstructed). The action of a 
communicant is perceived as a set of numerous 
parameters (Vdovichenko 2006: 32-33;
Vdovichenko 2009). Worth noting that semiotic 
(communicative) actions are analyzed and 
interpreted the same way as non-semiotic (non­
communicative) ones (cf. Morris 1946).
In fact, stating that only personal 
communicative actions can be generated and 
understood, the communicative model thereby 
demonstrates the impossibility of presenting a 
“sign” with the same certainty as the static 
language model did. It turns out that the 
communicative “sign” is appointed 
conditionally (in the language model it is stated 
unconditionally and definitely), it does not exist 
as an object or body (in the language model it 
exists as a dyad “sign’s body - meaning”), it just 
hints and refers to the sense-generating 
communicative action, being interpreted (in the 
language model it has a direct uniform meaning).
If in the language model the sign can be 
compared to a thing of a certain color (form- 
value), in the communicative model the “sign” 
is a conditionally (nominally) assigned and 
conditionally (utilitarianly) appointed form, 
hinting and referring to a specific value, that is, 
to the cognitive state of the author of the 
communicative action. The latter can be 
interpreted and understood.
Particular linguistic case of Aquila: 
communicative impacts (actions) instead of 
grammar
One can consider all above being a 
methodological introduction to the procedure of 
interpreting texts (being historical-linguistic- 
cultural data). At the same time, what has been 
said is some sort of a caveat:
To ignore the parameters of a
communicative procedure means to ignore the 
sense of what is happening (what the author is 
doing). Attempts to ascribe the sense-producing 
capacity to autonomic linguistic signs
(“language” or “grammar”) do not correspond to 
the reality of natural communicative (semiotic) 
process.
Though, that is definitely Aquila’s case.
In the 2nd century AD he made a new 
translation of the Hebrew Bible into Greek, 
because of the dissatisfaction of Judaic 
communities with the Septuagint (Silverstone 
1931). By that moment in the Jewish Greek­
speaking communities it became clear enough 
that the Septuagint had played too remarkable 
role in shaping the ideological basis for the 
“heresy of Christianity” (cf. Veltri 2006; 
Labendz 2009).
It is known and it is absolutely undoubted, 
that Aquila strictly followed a word-by-word 
translation strategy (Jellicoe 1968: 102-103). 
Particles pi, ^N, од, лк were translated with 
separate words. The Hebrew i (“and, but, 
though”, etc.) is always translated as кa^, etc. As 
a result, in the final text the standards of the 
Greek grammar - semantics, syntax, 
combinatory, and the Greek textuality in general 
- were violated much more, than ever in the 
Septuagint.
Thus, the most known episode which was 
mentioned by Hieronymus is rather illustrative 
(Hieronymus 1980): the part of Gen 1:1 лк 
уткп лк1 D'nwn was translated as guv tov 
oupavov Kal guv t^v yqv, that seems to mean 
roughly: “(at the beginning created God) with 
the sky and with the earth”. This not so 
understandable utterance came into being due to 
word-by-word translation strategy: the Hebrew 
word лк (which has identical consonant form 
both for the object marker, and, at the same time, 
for the proposition “with, together”) is translated 
with the Greek proposition guv “with, together”
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being the object marker from the grammatical 
viewpoint. Despite of the fact that the Greek 
proposition onv demands Dative one can see 
Accusative in Aquila’s text: xov onpavov, xpv 
ypv. Hieronymus was joking and laughing at 
Aquila’s translation just because of that. 
Anybody who knows Greek grammar is ready to 
do the same (cf. Lieberman 1965: 15-28).
However there is a definite problem here.
The fact is that Aquila was a Greek­
speaking person. He was even well- educated 
(Field 1875). He is sure to have known Greek 
much better than Hieronymus or anybody else in 
the 4nd c. AD or thousands years later. This 
‘language’ was known to him much better, than 
to anybody who is not dipped in a historical and 
cultural and religious context of a specific 
chronotope. His audience, by the way, was also 
Greek-speaking, Greek-reading and Greek- 
writing.
In other words, the translator himself and 
his audience, too, were totally aware of that ‘the 
Greek onv demands Dative’. Nevertheless the 
translator used Accusative after onv in front of 
the native speakers. How was that possible?
All this leads to the only solution: Aquila 
had a principally different aim of his job which 
was approved by himself and by the addressee 
of the translation. The criteria of doing this job 
were not the standards of Greek. It is impossible 
to judge Aquila on the base of Greek grammar 
because he had in mind and fulfilled another 
communicative task.
The sense of Aquila’s activity can be 
explained by the specific Jewish practice of 
reading and learning the Scripture. Every 
separate word could be an object of exegesis, 
that was clear to rabbi Akiba (Bereshit Rabba, I 
(Midrash Rabbah 1983); cf. Kiddushin 57а) and 
others.
The success in reaching Aquila’s 
communicative task can be testified by the fact 
that the translation was very popular in Jewish 
Greek-speaking communities even in the 
Byzantine period. Thus Justinian I in 553 edited 
the famous Novella 146 containing “permission 
granted to the Hebrews to read the Sacred 
Scriptures according to Tradition, in Greek,
Latin or any other Language” (Parkes 1934: 
392). Despite the strict attitude to the Hebrew 
hermeneutical methods of interpreting the 
sacred text, the use of Aquila’s translation is 
mentioned separately: “This therefore they shall 
primarily use, but that we may not seem to be 
forbidding all other texts, we allow the use of 
that of Aquila, though he was not of their people, 
and his translation differs not slightly from that 
of the Septuagint.” (Parkes 1934: 392-393) It is 
rather reliable that the Emperor gave the 
separate permission because of the wide 
popularity of Aquila’s version in Jewish 
communities of that time (Rutgers 2003: 
385-407).
It is also illustrative that Aquila’s text was 
found among the documents of the Cairo 
Genizah which were gathered there for the 
period of 870 CE to 19th century shedding some 
light to Jewish Middle-Eastern and North 
African history. Aquila’s translation was still in 
use by that time (Burkitt 1897: 47).
So, non-grammatical (or non-language) 
interpretation of what Aquila did, allows 
describing verbal data more correctly. The result 
of his work (as it was thought by himself) was 
not a translation in strict sense. That was a 
component of a traditional communicative 
practice. Aquila’s text can be appreciated and 
understood adequately just in the frame of this 
practice, being a part of the complex 
communicative action (the latter can be 
understood and interpreted, in contrast with 
language and grammar). His text had a big 
success not in the field of Greek language or 
grammar but in the field of communicative 
(historical-cultural-religious) reality. The same 
way as any other verbal text tends to be.
In turn, the texts of the Septuagint and the 
NT (which also meet reproaches in violating the 
standards of Greek grammar) should be 
considered as communicative activity, being 
integrated in the Jewish Diaspora practice of 
interpreting and creating the sacred text.
Conclusions
The communicative model of the verbal 
process allows us to represent the activities of 
the author of the verbal text as a consistent
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word-containing “hinting” at semiotic actions 
(impacts). Unlike verbal structures, semiotic 
acts (impacts) are interpreted as multifactorial, 
possessing such parameters as the author of the 
action (semiotic actor) had in his mind. The 
activity of Aquila can be adequately understood 
by reconstructing the authentic parameters of 
the semiotic actions he performed. To interpret 
his “translation”, it is necessary not so much the 
grammar of the Greek language as the 
complicated practice of reading and studying the 
text of Scripture in the Greek-speaking Jewish 
diaspora. Aquila in the strict sense did not 
translate into Greek, but created a word-for- 
word copy of the Hebrew text, which was used 
in Greek-speaking synagogues as an aid to 
ensure access to the original.
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